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Abstract
We employed an instrumental case study of a multisystem hydroelectric power producer, a high-reliability organization (HRO), to explore how new knowledge is created in a context in which errors may result in destruction, catastrophic consequences,
and even loss of human life. The findings indicate that knowledge creation is multilevel, nested within three levels of paradox: paradox of knowing, paradox of practice,
and paradox of organizing. The combination of the lack of opportunity for errors with
the dynamism of the HRO context necessitates that individuals work through multiple
paradoxes to generate and formalize new knowledge. The findings contribute to the literature on knowledge creation in context by explicating the work practices associated
with issue recognition, resolution, and refinement, and the formalization of knowledge
in failure-intolerant organizations.
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Nestled within the rugged mountains and shielded from the curious eye of outsiders,
the power plant can best be described as a truly “elegant, beautiful lady.” Upon entering the gates, we saw that what makes it powerful is also what makes it perilous. In front
of the main entrance stood a monument dedicated to those who lost their lives to this
power plant’s construction. And if the exterior left anything uncertain, our first encounter with the massive machines revealed the immense power of this plant. Several events
in its history stood as a reminder that a failure to appreciate the plant’s power may result
in catastrophe. Thus, mistake- free operation of this plant is a continuous objective—and
one that can be supported only by knowledge shared and created by those working in it
amid massive, powerful, and at times dangerous machines. To operate reliably in such a
context is to understand how knowledge expands and shapes every thought and action.
Knowledge in high-reliability organizations (HROs) takes a different form due to their
ambiguous, continuously evolving, and dangerous nature (Bierly & Spender, 1995; La Porte
& Consolini, 1991; Weick & Roberts, 1993). Weick and Roberts (1993: 357) describe HROs
as organizations that require “nearly error-free operations all the time because otherwise
they are capable of experiencing catastrophes.” In HROs, emphasis is placed on enacting
repositories of knowledge and reinforcing established procedures and routines (McIver,
Lengnick- Hall, Lengnick-Hall, & Ramachandran, 2013; Roberts, 1990). Individuals rely
on an existing repertoire of routinized behavior to act swiftly, yet mindfully, when faced
with a potentially dangerous problem (Levinthal & Rerup, 2006).
However, the dynamism of the HRO context often generates unpredictable and nonroutine problems where previous knowledge is insufficient and new knowledge must be
created. Extant research suggests that in the face of nonroutine problems, experimentation and errors catalyze new knowledge creation (McIver et al., 2013; Schulz, 2001). Individuals think through previously made errors to create new knowledge that can then be
utilized in similar situations (McIver et al., 2013; Zhao, 2011). Yet relying on errors may
be challenging in a context where a misstep can create fatal consequences. That is, “some
organizations must not make serious errors because their work is too important and the
effects of their failures too disastrous” (La Porte & Consolini, 1991: 19).
Given this, HROs require strict rules and careful enactment of current knowledge to
ensure reliability (La Porte & Consolini, 1991; Levinthal & Rerup, 2006). At the same
time, these organizations must allow for rule breaking and questioning of current knowledge when faced with poorly understood, nonroutine problems (McIver et al., 2013; Roberts, 1990). In other words, in HROs, individuals must both enact and challenge current
knowledge as they search for solutions to the problem amid potentially hazardous circumstances. Therefore, the process of knowledge creation in HROs seems to be paradoxical:
Individuals must enact current knowledge to comprehend a given problem, but also challenge current knowledge because it may not be appropriate for solving the problem (Garud, Dunbar, & Bartel, 2010; Roberts, 1990). The idea of paradoxes in HROs has been suggested (Roberts, 1990), but, to our knowledge, not conceptually or empirically explored.
Building on the paradoxical nature of knowledge in HROs, we ask this: How is new
knowledge created in this context? We take an emic approach to explore paradoxes within
the knowledge creation process in the dangerous context of HROs. We follow the framework put forth by Nonaka and colleagues (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & Von Krogh, 2009), who
conceptualize knowledge creation as a process consisting of two interrelated phases—
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knowledge emergence and knowledge formalization. Knowledge emergence occurs when
existing knowledge boundaries are crossed, facilitating a cognitive change and development of new insights (Tsoukas, 2009). Knowledge formalization involves the reshaping,
clarification, and integration of these new insights into the organizational knowledge system (De Boer, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 1999).
To further our understanding of knowledge creation in HROs, we apply insights from
paradox theory (Poole & Van de Ven, 1989; Smith & Lewis, 2011). Paradox theory recognizes tensions arising from the coexistence of opposing forces in organizations (Leana &
Barry, 2000; Smith & Lewis, 2011). Paradox turns one’s attention away from simplification toward the relationships between opposing phenomena, creating more complex theorizing. Despite its promise, however, few studies move from recognizing paradoxes in
organizations to theorizing about how these paradoxes are experienced and navigated in
practice (Lewis, 2000). In this study, we acknowledge paradoxes inherent in our phenomenon of interest and endeavor to understand how individuals experience and navigate
paradoxes to create new knowledge.
Our main contribution is creating a framework of knowledge creation in context that
illustrates the interrelatedness of knowledge emergence and knowledge formalization,
and embodies the paradoxes that individuals navigate to create new knowledge. Although previous research recognizes the paradoxical properties of knowledge (Kumar,
2011; Leonard- Barton, 1992), to our knowledge no empirical research has explored the
nature of these paradoxes and their formative importance to the knowledge creation
process. Thus, our findings extend theory in three ways. First, we extend understanding
of knowledge in organizations by explicating three levels of paradox embedded within
the knowledge creation process: paradox of knowing that exists in the tension between
the known and the unknown, paradox of practice that illustrates the struggle associated
with the integration of the new insights, and paradox of organizing that encapsulates
tensions related to the organizational structure. Second, in providing a clearer, theorydriven definition of HROs, we extend theory by illustrating (a) the nature of interdependencies that make HROs hazardous and (b) the paradoxes embedded in this context.
Finally, we interweave our findings with the literature to problematize the current understanding of knowledge in organizations and theorize how insights from HROs may
extend to non-HRO contexts.

Using a Paradox Lens to Understand Knowledge Creation in HROS
Paradox Theory
Organizational research tends to favor consistency, linearity, and stability to allow for
more elegant theorizing and consequently, more precise implications (Whetten, 1989).
Yet, this elegant theorizing is often critiqued for its inability to capture the complexities
and paradoxes inherent in social organizing (Eisenhardt, 2000; Poole & Van de Ven, 1989;
Smith & Lewis, 2011). To this end, embracing paradox can be useful as it may facilitate
generation of new theoretical and practical insight (Farjoun, 2010; Lado, Boyd, Wright,
& Kroll, 2006). For example, Smith and Lewis (2011) argue that an organization’s survival is partially dependent on its ability to respond to paradoxical tensions; Lado et al.
(2006) suggest that the theoretical and practical promise of the resource-based view is
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possible only when its inherent paradox is embraced; and Coff, Coff, and Eastvold (2006)
emphasize the importance of paradox to the management of organizational knowledge.
Paradox is the coexistence of two opposing states that are logical in isolation but irrational when placed together (Poole & Van de Ven, 1989; Smith & Lewis, 2011). Even a
cursory view of organizational literature is sufficient to recognize that this coexistence
permeates the most fundamental organizational issues such as the struggle between innovation and efficiency (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009; Davis, Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2009;
Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996), change and stability (Farjoun, 2010; Leana & Barry, 2000), or
the known and the unknown (Bass & Chakrabarty, 2014; Lewis, 2000; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008). For example, the paradox of change and stability allows researchers to transcend the question of whether organizations are stable systems or a result of emergent activities (Poole & Van de Ven, 1989; Uhl-Bien & Marion, 2009) by interrelating the tension
between regularity (stability) and adaptability (change) (Eisenhardt, 2000; Leana & Barry,
2000). Embracing paradox provides insight into how moderate experimentation (changeoriented activities) can foster increased reliability (stability-oriented activities) (Farjoun,
2010) and why routine procedures may be critical for working through the nonroutine
(Pentland, Feldman, Becker, & Liu, 2012).
Organizations also tend to experience a continuous struggle between what is already
known and what needs to be discovered. This paradox of known and unknown emerges
as contexts change and new problems arise, making previous knowledge obsolete (Kumar, 2011; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008; Smith & Lewis, 2011). Knowledge that once enabled success may subsequently play a role in organizational failure through galvanized
“core rigidities” (Leonard-Barton, 1992). To this end, previous research emphasizes errors as triggers to break rigidities imposed by previous understanding (Catino & Patriotta,
2013; Zhao, 2011). New knowledge is created as errors are detected, corrected, and analyzed, thus expanding the repertoire of available responses (Farjoun, 2010; Madsen, 2009).
Although new knowledge creation through the analysis of errors is useful in “failuretolerant” organizations (Edmondson, 1999), this may not be viable in contexts in which
errors generate hazardous consequences, such as HROs (Bierly & Spender, 1995; La Porte
& Consolini, 1991). Thus, a tension exists in the need to create knowledge via exploration and discovery (both of which are often error-laden) while maintaining error-free, reliable operation. Recognizing this, Roberts (1990: 160-161) asks, “How adequate can such
a literature [based on trial and error] be when addressing phenomena at least partially derived from precisely the opposite conditions?”

High-Reliability Organizations
Research on HROs stems from work on high-risk systems (Bierly & Spender, 1995; Perrow, 1984), or systems that (a) have potential to create hazardous consequences such as
large-scale accidents and fatalities, (b) are characterized by complex interactions, and (c)
are tightly coupled. Complex interactions are “of unfamiliar sequence, or unplanned and
unexpected sequences, and either not visible or not immediately comprehensible” (Perrow, 1984: 78). Tightly coupled entails the proximity between interacting components
so that what happens in one affects what happens in another. In essence, risk is created
in this context because of the existence of interacting components that can produce unplanned or nonroutine events that are difficult to immediately comprehend.
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Although Perrow (1984) did not differentiate among hazard, risk, and reliability, subsequent research recognized that although high-risk organizations are capable of catastrophes, rarely does one in fact occur (Leveson, Dulac, Marais, & Carroll, 2009; Roberts,
1990; Weick & Roberts, 1993). Indeed, although these organizations are high-hazard in
the sense that they have high potential to generate catastrophic events, the risk is low because the probability that such event will take place is minimized through emphasis on
reliability (La Porte & Consolini, 1991; Roberts, 1990). This insight shifted exploration
from what makes these organizations risky to what makes them reliable (Bierly & Spender,
1995; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2008). Reliability in HROs expounds from technical
expertise, systemwide processes, and a strong focus on learning (La Porte & Consolini,
1991; Roberts, 1990). Weick et al. (2008) further suggest that what makes HROs reliable
is full attention on failure and emphasis on complex understanding, resilience, and appreciation of experience when faced with potentially catastrophic events.
Despite this focused description, the HRO term has been applied in less precise ways—
many complex, tightly coupled systems are in fact not hazardous, and many hazardous
systems are loosely coupled with low accidents rates (Leveson et al., 2009). We build on
previous HRO research and define HROs as organizations that are capable of producing catastrophes (not just errors but consequences that can endanger multiple constituents) but
are also characterized by systemwide processes (i.e., knowledge creation) that help maintain
mistake-free operation despite their hazardous nature (Farjoun, 2010; Leveson et al., 2009).
Knowledge creation in HROs. The HRO context requires individuals to oscillate between
applying knowledge in predictable, routine events and creating new knowledge in unpredictable, nonroutine events (Bigley & Roberts, 2001). Although previous research recognized that knowledge facilitates reliability in HROs (La Porte & Consolini, 1991; Weick et
al., 2008), insight into how this occurs is fragmented at best. For example, studies suggest
that when prior experience is relevant to a problem, individuals rely on that experience
to generate a timely solution (Levinthal & Rerup, 2006; McIver et al., 2013). An assumption is that individuals have complete knowledge and are able to enact that knowledge
appropriately (McIver et al., 2013). However, this assumption may not hold for several
reasons. First, individuals may lack the relevant knowledge due to deficiencies in training or preparation (Leveson et al., 2009). Second, the problem may not be part of the current organizational knowledge repertoire (i.e., the problem is unknown) (La Porte & Consolini, 1991). Third, the context may be dynamic, requiring more variety in response to
generate the solution (Farjoun, 2010). Here, we focus on the creation of new knowledge
when faced with unknown problems in the dynamic HRO context.
Circumstances often arise in HROs where unknown problems necessitate the creation
of new knowledge. In non-HRO contexts, small errors and near misses are often useful in
creating new knowledge in response to unknown problems (Carroll, Rudolph, & Hatakenaka, 2002; Dillon & Tinsley, 2008; Farjoun, 2010; Morris & Moore, 2000). However, errors
and near misses may produce catastrophic consequences in HROs due to their dynamic nature. In HROs, new knowledge must be created through the focus on reliable, error-free operation. Therefore, we have somewhat contradictory understanding of (a) how individuals
work through problems without errors to generate new knowledge and (b) how new knowledge is formalized and integrated into the organizational knowledge system. In this article we illustrate a two-phase process through which new knowledge is created in an HRO.
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Research Method
Research Setting
General HRO context. The setting for this study is a hydroelectric energy producer,
“Marion,” located in Southeastern Europe. Marion is composed of four units comprising
nine hydroelectric energy power plants that are functionally interconnected and interdependent with one another: Unit “BB,” Unit “LIM,” Unit “ZB,” and Unit “CAC.” At the time
the BB unit began operation in 1966, it was one of the largest hydroelectric power producers in the region. Over time (1974-1982), a series of additions and reorganizations (CAC
and ZB merged with BB in 1992 and the LIM system was added in 2005) increased Marion’s size, but also facilitated knowledge sharing and reliable operation across all plants.
Cross-plant meetings and integrated reliability procedures increased Marion’s production
capability as well as ensured a more standardized approach to safety.
Marion is an HRO because, on one hand, it is capable of experiencing hazardous events,
but on the other, it maintains relatively reliable performance through systemwide processes. The potential to produce hazardous events stems from the dangerous materials
individuals work with and the large machines that are interconnected and can, as our
participants indicated, act unpredictably. To maintain reliable performance, Marion has
specific procedures for operation, extensive training and debriefings, and invited safety
inspections. This preoccupation with reliability (Weick et al., 2008) ensures the most appropriate conduct permeates all organizational levels—from engineers working directly
with the machines to executives overseeing the organization.
Local context. Nested within the general HRO context is the event-specific local context. Due to the hazardous and continually changing nature of the plants in the Marion
system, events occur that, if not immediately attended to, could create systemwide failure. In some instances, those events are routine in the sense that individuals have encountered them before and can utilize current knowledge to neutralize them. In other instances, the events are nonroutine with unknown causes, rendering current knowledge
incomplete and requiring the generation of new knowledge.
Routine events (such as precautionary adjustments, fine-tuning, or minor problems) are
important because they prevent serious consequences from occurring. Although routine
events are often viewed as stable and repetitive activities that ensure consistency in organizing, they are also dynamic, thus precluding the existence of any two perfectly similar routine events and inciting slight adjustment and adaptation of individuals’ responses
and actions (Cohen, 2007; Pentland et al., 2012; Turner & Rindova, 2012). Due to the dynamism embedded in the routine events, knowledge created through them entails a refinement and/or augmentation of current knowledge.
Nonroutine events often arise as small, controllable problems but have the potential to
escalate into systemwide catastrophes because the nature of the problem is not immediately known. As such, relying on existing knowledge is insufficient in this situation. New
knowledge must be created to define the event and neutralize it to avoid error and maintain reliable operation of the plant (Garud et al., 2010; Tsoukas, 2009). To contextualize
our findings, we begin with a description of an instance in which a routine event rapidly
transformed into a nonroutine event.
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During a scheduled inspection of the BB power plant, a mistake triggered a series of
unexpected, catastrophic events. During this inspection, an individual’s continual awareness of the equipment sparked observation that oil levels in the power switch were low.
Rather than initially inquiring into why this was occurring, this individual reached over
for closer inspection. In doing so, the routine event (low oil levels) escalated into an extremely hazardous nonroutine event. The supervisor yelled out to get the individual’s attention. However, it was a matter of seconds before the individual closed the electric circuit, resulting in electric shock and serious bodily injury.
The supervisor and two other employees rushed to the individual and immediately
administered first aid. Other workers, though visibly disturbed by the event, had to refocus their attention and tend to the malfunctioning machine that now was acting completely erratically. At this point, standard procedures did not aid in the analysis and response to the problem. This was because the problem, at this point, was nonroutine. The
workers engaged in initial inquiry to discover distinctive characteristics of the event and
coordinate insights by sharing and recombining their experiences. The next 10 hours
were critical. The team stayed on the premises, carefully adjusting the machine through
knowledgeable action, while simultaneously tending to the accident. Once a preliminary
solution was generated, the supervisor immediately contacted BB plant executives to arrange a localized meeting so that the emergent insights could be refined and integrated
into the formal knowledge structure. We utilize this event in the coming paragraphs to
contextualize our findings.

Data Collection Procedures
We adopted an emic approach to explore knowledge creation “from within” and capture the insider’s view of the process. We conducted an instrumental case study (Stake,
1995) and used multiple sources of data including formal interviews, informal conversations, observations, and archival data such as internal documents, governmental reports, and news articles. Triangulation of data sources improved the robustness of the
findings (Creswell, 2007).
Interviews. The primary data source was 17 semistructured interviews conducted oneonone with participants either in their private offices or in a meeting room in Marion. In
addition, we talked to participants informally during observation and transportation to
different units in the Marion system (distances ranged from several minutes to 2 hours
away). We first interviewed the general counsel and the health and safety manager. These
individuals were our key informants because they are highly knowledgeable about Marion, its practices, and events that occurred throughout its history. In the second round of
interviews, we spoke with the general managers of each power plant. From there, we used
a snowball sampling technique to identify others who were involved with, or had substantial information about, knowledge practices in Marion. The interviewees were predominantly male (15 males and 2 females—the workforce was predominately male), averaging 15 years of experience with Marion.
Observation. The first author spent every work day for the first 4 weeks of the study at
the site, traveling between plants and spending time with employees both at and outside
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work. During this time, the first author had several opportunities to observe meetings as
well as employee interactions. Observation allowed us to gain insight into the regular operation of the organization as well as appreciate its tightly coupled and hazardous nature.
Observing the machines and the interaction of engineers with the machines allowed us
to further contextualize our findings as well as to experience practice from the view of
the participants. An observational protocol was used to record “descriptive” and “reflective” accounts of knowledge- related activities (Creswell, 2007).
Archival data. Though we did not rely extensively on archival data, they provided
useful historical information that helped us appreciate Marion’s hazardous nature. Particularly helpful was documentation tracing the history of the organization, documentation describing the nature of the equipment, and a book containing performance and
safety information for each plant over the past 20 years. Archival data also highlighted
the importance and continuous revision of safety procedures.

Data Analysis
Driven by the extant literature, we started data collection with the intent to understand how individuals in Marion make decisions (La Porte & Consolini, 1991; Leveson et
al., 2009). However, when we asked if there is anything we need to know that we did not
cover in our questions, our key informants replied that to understand Marion we must
understand the importance of knowledge for reliable operation. Based on this insight, we
revised our research question and successive data collection activities. Subsequent stages
were marked with iterative movement between data collection, data analysis, and the literature to refine the logic of our emergent themes.
In the initial stages of our analysis, we focused on three categories of codes: expected
codes (e.g., interaction of more and less experienced individuals; the importance of noticing unusual signals), surprising codes (e.g., flexibility rather constancy of experience),
and unusual codes (e.g., paradoxes that individuals experience and navigate to create new
knowledge) (Creswell, 2007). Initial codes formed the first-order codes in the data structure. In the following stage, we used the coding process to generate a description of the
setting and identify researcher-induced themes embodying the knowledge creation process (Creswell, 2007). This gave rise to second-order codes that allowed a more holistic
understanding of the data (Bansal & Corley, 2012). Our approach to coding resulted in
the data structure reported in Table 1. In the last stage, we interwove the interpretation
of the findings with the literature to construct the final narrative.
To confirm the validity of our findings, we utilized triangulation, member checking,
and thick description (Creswell, 2007). First, we searched for convergence across different sources by interviewing individuals from different levels of the hierarchy and from
different plants. We triangulated our findings with observational and archival data. We
also asked our informants if the themes that we identified made sense and whether our
overall description reflected their experiences. This resulted in further refinement of our
findings. Finally, we employed thick description in the presentation of our findings. We
provide rich, detailed, emic insight into the practices that constitute knowledge creation
in Marion as experienced by our participants.

Statements about the importance of long tenure with the organization as well as
involvement with various emergent projects. Experience is what engineers rely
on to guide their understanding of both emergent and planned events.

4. Recombination of
experiences

√

√

√

√

√

Statements indicating the dangerous and continuously evolving context in Marion.
Informants described how even the smallest inattentiveness may result in tragic
consequences.

8. The nature of the
HRO context:
interdependencies
and hierarchy

√

Statements indicating formal rules and procedures that are binding for all. Informants
√
described these procedures as codified prescriptions of how to act in a given situation.

7. The formal knowledge
structure

√

√

√ 		

√ 			

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

in a

Statements describing the actions toward the emergent problem. Informants indicated
the need for the “right action at the right time” to avoid mistakes that can “cost
human lives.”
6. The informal knowledge Statements indicating the existence of a dynamic understanding of how things should
structure
be done that is not yet a part of the formal system. It allows engineers to maintain a
degree of flexibility in their actions.

Statements indicating how engineers adjust to each other’s observations and		
experiences during the questioning process. It is this dynamic adjustment that
allows them to integrate diverse viewpoints quickly.

3. Coordination processes

√

√

K n o w l e d g e C r e at i o n

5. Knowledgeable action

Statements about the questioning process once the trigger has been observed.
Informants referred to this process as “consultation” in which they engage to
define the problem.

2. Initial inquiry

√

Statements indicating the necessity of understanding the plant as a complex system
√
and thus being continuously alert as to what is going on.		

Routine Nonroutine Knowledge Knowledge
Events
Events
Emergence Formalization

1. Continual awareness

Dimension of the Knowledge		
Creation Process
Data Description

Phase of the Knowledge
Creation Process

of

Local Context

Statements about the importance of preventive maintenance to ensure reliable performance.
Planned activities are considered essential in preventing unintended surprises.
Statements describing unplanned, emergent events. Informants often described these events
as a sense that “something is not right.” These events acted as triggers to the process of
new discovery.

Routine events

Nonroutine events

Data Description

Local Context

Table 1. Data Structure of the Knowledge Creation Process in Routine and Nonroutine Events in a High Reliability Organization
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Figure 1. The Knowledge Creation Process Along Two Paths in a High-Reliability Organization

Findings
To illustrate the knowledge creation process in HROs, we present our findings in two
phases: knowledge emergence (Phase 1) and knowledge formalization (Phase 2). Our
findings show that the knowledge creation process takes on two separate paths depending on the local context (routine or nonroutine event) (Figure 1). During the knowledge
emergence phase (Phase 1) occurring within routine events, individuals rely on their
experiences, recombination of those experiences, and localized discourse to select the
most appropriate solution from an existing knowledge repertoire and adapt it to the contingencies of the situation. Once the solution is selected and adapted, the formalization phase (Phase 2) entails the refinement and/or augmentation of the informal knowledge structure. Conversely, during nonroutine events, the knowledge emergence phase
(Phase 1) involves individuals first defining the problem through initial inquiry and
coordination then combining their experiences through knowledgeable action to generate, rather than select, a solution tailored to the situation. In nonroutine events, the
knowledge formalization phase (Phase 2) involves immediate discussion of the solution via localized meetings, leading to prompt integration of the emergent insight into
the formal knowledge structure.
Our findings reveal that individuals experience three levels of paradox—individual,
collective, and organizational—in the knowledge creation process. At the individual level,
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Figure 2. Three Levels of Paradox Existing Within the Knowledge Creation Process
in a High-Reliability Organization

the paradox of knowing uncovers the struggle individuals experience as they work to categorize an event as routine or nonroutine and generate a preliminary understanding of
the problem. At the collective level, the paradox of practice uncovers the struggle embedded in the distributed nature of knowledge in action and the coexistence of the formal
and informal knowledge structures. Finally, at the organizational level, the paradox of organizing uncovers the tension between stability and change that permeates the entire organization, thus shaping the knowledge creation process in its entirety. These paradoxes
are depicted in Figure 2. Select participants’ descriptions are interwoven throughout our
findings, while others are provided in Table 2.

Phase 1 of the Knowledge Creation Process: New Knowledge Emergence
The importance of knowing existing procedures in Marion is exemplified in the written rules and procedures posted on the walls of each plant in view of the employees on
their way to the machine area. Employees interweave these procedures in their work to
ensure reliable performance. However, the complex nature of Marion occasionally generates unpredictable and nonroutine events in which current procedures may not be applicable. When they occur, individuals heedfully interrelate to connect “sufficient individual know-how to meet situational demands” (Weick & Roberts, 1993: 366), collectively
decreasing the possibility of catastrophe. In exploring how individuals in Marion heedfully interrelate to create new knowledge, we discovered five themes: continual awareness, initial inquiry, coordination processes, experience, and knowledgeable action.
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Table 2. Themes, Codes, and Data of Knowledge Creation in a High-Reliability Organization
Theme

Code

Representative Data

The process
1. Continual
of new
awareness
knowledge		
emergence		

“Simply put, it is all about monitoring the condition of the
machines . . . to know when something can be done by the way
the equipment looks like. There are criteria that you have to
know and to watch for to know what is going on.”

2. Initial inquiry
		

“The problem is solved through asking questions. When I am not
sure what is going on I ask others.”

3. Coordination
processes
		
		

“. . . when things go wrong, one man even when he has the greatest
knowledge of it all cannot solve it . . . there need to be others
who will ask questions or subquestions and help find the way
that is the best.”

4. Recombination of
experiences
		

“[Experience] is significant. For 37 years a lot to see and learn. . . .
It simply means you know how to follow the process, how to
manage the production and so on.”

5. Knowledgeable
action
		

“There were some abnormalities in the aggregate and we could not
figure out the problem . . . so we decided to stop it and analyze
the levels and the problem was solved.”

The
formalization
of new
practices

“It is within the organization itself, if we see that something
became a practice and it is good . . . it brings good and it is not
part of the formal system, we make it a part, we regulate it.

6. The informal
knowledge
structure

7. The formal
knowledge
structure
		
		
		

“They are essential [formal procedures] and you have to know
them. The production of electric energy brings with it issues
that are dangerous for people and environment . . . and we
have to deal with that. We need to know and act according to
the procedures in each situation. . . . They help you solve the
problems.”

HRO context

8. Nature of the
HRO context:
interdependencies
and hierarchy
		
		
		

“There are these demands, pressures stemming from the system
[procedures] to operate according to them . . . and there is a
question of how to maintain all of it, and still operate by the
rules . . . it is a balancing act . . . you need to estimate whether
something can pass, skip over some rule. What the risk would
be given the problem you are facing and what the constraints
are.”

•• Routine events
		
		
		
		

“We operate under the specifications of the annual plan. In
situations where something out of the ordinary happens we
deal with that at the spot. . . . When the issue is simple and I
have all the information I need, I act in accordance to my
experience and procedures.”

•• Nonroutine events
		
		
		

“Not everything can be specified ahead of time . . . the plant is
a process, a living thing . . . something is always happening . . .
you have to be technically correct and safe and to address each
and every element when something does not look right.”

Continual awareness (Dimension 1 of the knowledge creation process). HROs are fundamentally dynamic in that even the most routine events and slight irregularities may
quickly transform into hazardous ones (La Porte & Consolini, 1991; Perrow, 1984). In this
context, changes are seen as warning signs that ought to be evaluated to prevent failure
(Dillon & Tinsley, 2008; Farjoun, 2010; Turner & Rindova, 2012). As a consequence, individuals must continually be aware of their surroundings and attune to familiar and less
familiar signals.
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This awareness coupled with prolonged, careful observation of the behavior of the machines and understanding how the machines should behave (e.g., normal idiosyncratic
sounds versus abnormal sounds that suggest immediate correction is needed) enables individuals to anticipate when something is, or could be, wrong. An engineer explained that
“incidents may occur out of the blue and many things can be detected earlier if you watch
carefully for them.” In other words, “watch[ing] for them” allows individuals to anticipate
an event and engage in activities necessary to neutralize threats to reliable operation. As
such, employees do frequent “rounds of the equipment” to observe their operations. During observations they focus on (a) visual cues, (b) sounds, (c) smells, and (d) movements,
relying on their knowledge to differentiate between those that are regular from those that
are irregular. The reliance on all senses is not surprising, as previous research implies that
acute awareness stems from the senses, enabling individuals to anticipate and respond to
situational changes (Cunliffe & Coupland, 2012; Tsoukas, 2009). Acute awareness enables
Marion employees to recognize cues that something might be out of the ordinary:
It started with one man during his regular round of the aggregate . . . he heard a
sound coming from the turbine that was somewhat different than normal and instantaneously notified others.

However, continual awareness does not, in itself, allow individuals to categorize the
event as routine or not. For example, in the event described above, the engineer engaged
in continual awareness by noticing that the oil levels in the power switch were unusually
low. The awareness allowed the engineer to notice the irregular signal, but was insufficient, as subsequent events indicate, to properly categorize the event. To do so and correspondingly trigger the appropriate set of actions, individuals must engage in initial inquiry.
Initial inquiry (Dimension 2 of the knowledge creation process). Once they notice an irregularity, employees in Marion engage in questioning to generate a preliminary understanding and classify the event as routine or nonroutine. Immersion into a dialogue with
knowledgeable others fosters a setting in which individuals question their own assumptions and search for links between contradictions and diverse insights (Ford & Ford, 1994;
Smith & Lewis, 2011). These links establish shared understanding that enables contextspecific actions (Turner & Rindova, 2012). Initial inquiry is akin to Weick and Roberts’s
(1993) heedful interrelating in that individuals flip through their mental repositories as
well as the repositories of others to form connections between their know-how and the
contingencies of the situation. This inquiry is dialectic with questions spiraling out of
other questions until the individuals tentatively agree on the categorization of the event.
As demonstrated in Figure 1, when the event is categorized as routine, initial inquiry
acts as a recollection mechanism through which individuals exploit collective knowledge
and build initial insight necessary to incite the appropriate action. In routine events, individuals transition relatively quickly from initial inquiry to recombination of their diverse experiences to select the most appropriate solution from the repertoire of current
knowledge practices (Figure 2). The transition is particularly vague as the recombination
of experiences commences almost simultaneously with initial inquiry. The fact that the
“solution is never the same” illustrates the dynamism, and at times complexity, of routine
events, which consequently creates a space for new knowledge emergence even within a
“known” event. A plant manager explained the process:
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When we estimate that the issue is simple, and when there is already a procedure in
place, we generate several possible solutions . . . we lay them down side by side, and
analyze how to use them. . . . When this occurs, I rely on workers closest to the issue.
And you have to understand, the solution is never the same. There always needs to
be explanation of why this solution was chosen and how it changed.

In contrast, as depicted in Figure 1, when the event is categorized as nonroutine, individuals utilize initial inquiry to determine “what the event is not and what should not
be done.” Individuals make sense of their experiences by engaging in thought experiments, contemplating what could have been and what could happen in the future (Morris
& Moore, 2000). Determining what the event is not is a form of a thought experiment in
which individuals utilize their knowledge not to select the solution (as in routine events),
but to explore the boundaries of the event and discard irrelevant information. By exploring what the event is not, individuals minimize opportunities for inappropriate action
(this process did not take place in our example, resulting in improper action). One engineer explained this as a process of “consultation” with colleagues, while another stated,
“When I am unsure what is happening, I always consult with others.”
Coordination processes (Dimension 3 of the knowledge creation process). In routine
events, individuals rely on their experiences and recombination of those experiences to
select the most appropriate solution to resolve the issue (Schulz, 2001). In contrast, during nonroutine events, initial inquiry transitions into coordination processes during which
individuals collectively build understanding about the event. They do so by dynamically
iterating between various alternatives (Leveson et al., 2009; Smith & Lewis, 2011), facilitating a string of microadaptations in an effort to form preliminary agreement regarding
what the event is. This is in line with what Weick (1987) and Bierly and Spender (1995)
term “rich analysis.” Collectives engage in rich analysis because each person in the collective is both an individual observer and a dependent of the collective. As multiple individuals engage in raw talk and adjust to each other’s insights, new knowledge emerges
(Bierly & Spender, 1995). To support this, one of our participants explained that even those
with the most experience cannot know everything. Individuals must ask questions and
listen to others (i.e., adjust to differing insights), “always look[ing] to get mutual agreement” so that new knowledge can emerge:
When a major intervention is necessary and an action is needed . . . there must
be coordination between me and the manager, either technical or production
manager and a few others—mostly those in the plant when the intervention
is needed . . . and we always look to get mutual agreement.

Individual-level paradox: Paradox of knowing in the knowledge creation process. Continual awareness is a trigger for the knowledge creation process. Once individuals become
aware of the event, initial inquiry enables them to codify it as routine or nonroutine, thus
activating one of the two paths of knowledge creation (Figure 1). This process also gives
rise to the individual-level paradox: paradox of knowing. That is, the awareness of the
event requires timely action—often within minutes. However, improper action may have
grave consequences, as illustrated in the example above. As such, individuals must simultaneously utilize and question their current knowledge to make appropriate distinctions
and generate a preliminary understanding of the event (routine or nonroutine). Previous
knowledge is critical because it allows them to identify known patterns (Farjoun, 2010;
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Pentland et al., 2012). At the same time, failure to challenge existing knowledge may result in premature action and potential escalation of the event. Consequently, individuals
must resist simplification and remain in a state of paradox between the known and the
unknown—that is, paradox of knowing. Given this, we offer the following proposition:
Proposition 1a: In HROs, individuals’ reliance on their existing knowledge while simultaneously questioning it builds understanding and decreases the possibility of error during
knowledge emergence.

In the context of nonroutine events, initial inquiry acts as impetus for coordination processes. In this transition, individuals open up space for multiple interpretations of what
is happening by interweaving their insights with that of others. Individuals rely on their
knowledge to critically evaluate the knowledge of others as they identify known aspects
of the event and search for ways to infuse new sense into the situation. In doing so, individuals simultaneously reinforce and challenge each other’s understanding to, on one
hand, solidify what is known and, on the other, prevent previous knowledge from clouding discovery. Given this, we propose,
Proposition 1b: In HROs, when the event is unknown, simultaneous sharing and challenging
of insights from multiple individuals through coordination processes expands the knowledge base while decreasing the possibility of error.

Recombination of experiences (Dimension 4 of the knowledge creation process). Experience is a driving force behind initial inquiry and the ability to dynamically adjust to others to comprehend the event. It enables individuals to more clearly articulate what the
event is not by comparing it to events that have occurred previously (Morris & Moore,
2000). For example, Langley and Tsoukas (2010: 4) argue that experiences incorporate the
past and the present: “Unlike substances, which do not include one another but are seen
as nested, standing under one another—sub-stantia—experiences include other experiences and grow out of the integration of bodily and mental events into something new.”
In other words, individuals recombine their various experiences and make them relevant
to the local contingencies (Schulz, 2001). Indeed, recombination of experiences tends to
enhance reliability in contexts facing frequent perturbations and unpredictability, such
as HROs (Farjoun, 2010).
Bourdieu’s (1990: 54) description of experience as “a product of history. . . . It ensures
the active presence of past experiences, which, deposited in each organism in the form of
schemes of perception, thought and action, tend to guarantee the correctness of practices
and their constancy over time” was relevant to our findings. However, rather than constancy of practice, experience at Marion enables flexibility of practice. Flexibility of practice is evident in the practitioners’ engagement with practice, their anticipation of what
might happen next, and their adjustment to that anticipation (Lewis, 2000; Sandberg &
Tsoukas, 2015). Whether in a routine or nonroutine event, individuals know that they
must at least partially adapt (routine events) or critically challenge (nonroutine events)
each practice. Flexible experience allows individuals to make the knowledge relevant to
a given situation and appropriately react to ambiguous stimuli. It enables them to engage
“all [their senses] into the discovery”:
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When a malfunction occurs, based on your extensive experience, you know how to
react . . . you use all your senses and you know how to react. These experiences are
valuable and necessary, without it you cannot work.

Knowledgeable action (Dimension 5 of the knowledge creation process). During routine
events, knowledgeable action entails application of the selected solution to neutralize the
event. Based on initial inquiry and recombination of experiences, individuals collectively
identify the most appropriate solution that is then carefully applied to the problem (McIver et al., 2013). Thus, there is a distinct separation of thought and action. In contrast,
during nonroutine events, the separation of initial inquiry and recombination of experiences is blurred, making it difficult to discern where one begins and the other ends. Questioning and coordination are still occurring at the moment individuals decide to act. It is
through “articulation [that] practitioners obtain a clearer understanding of what they do
by becoming aware of the distinctions they have been following” (Tsoukas, 2009: 943).
Articulation occurring during questioning and coordination allows individuals to more
fully comprehend what is transpiring and enact their knowledge in a more mindful manner, thus decreasing the possibility of error. The action, in turn, generates pieces of information to be internalized for new knowledge to emerge. During routine events, the incoming pieces of information reinforce and augment the current knowledge structure.
These minor adjustments become a part of the collective understanding. During nonroutine events, incoming pieces of information catalyze new knowledge emergence. The action is needed “at the right time” to generate the influx of novelty necessary to comprehend the situation (Pentland et al., 2012; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015). That is, individuals
can understand the situation only through their actions, and actions can be known only
after they occur (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015). The influx of novelty relaxes current understanding, opening up space for knowledge emergence. One of our informants described
knowledgeable action as inseparable from problem solution:
There was this problem with the aggregate . . . we weren’t sure what was going on . .
. after discussion with the men on the floor we decided to turn the aggregate off, but
the problem continued . . . so we turned off all the machines because we realized
that there was no more time to wait. We had to act fast.

Collective-level paradox: Paradox of practice in the knowledge creation process. As much
as experience drives initial inquiry and coordination, inquiry and coordination also enrich experience. Our participants described nonroutine events as a “rite of passage” for
less experienced employees. To this end, participation in these events provides those with
less experience an opportunity to interact with more experienced individuals, highlighting the importance of flexibility, rather than constancy, of practice and appreciation for
the ambiguity of their work (La Porte & Consolini, 1991). At the same time, however, less
experienced individuals play a key role in facilitating questions and challenging the current understanding. Indeed, the blending of more and less experienced workers aligns
with the idea that organizational knowledge can be “increased if more levels of experience
are connected, as when newcomers who take nothing for granted interrelate more often
with old-timers who think they have seen it all” (Weick & Roberts, 1993: 366). In Marion,
the interaction between more and less experienced allows individuals to remain open to
new insights and creates a context in which new knowledge can emerge:
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When I started working in the KB plant I had a manager who really helped me and with
whom I did all the electrical things, on the same machine . . . he’s a man with great experience and knowledge and I owe him a lot, as far as my present experience.

Although experience is critical in nonroutine events, it is through the enactment of
that experience that new knowledge emerges. As individuals engage in questioning and
coordination, they also consider what an appropriate action might be. Because the problem they face is not fully known, the most appropriate action is often difficult to identify.
Individuals must discover the appropriate action based on questioning and coordination,
and observe what happens after action occurs. Paradox exists because premature action
can lead to deadly consequences. However, without action, only limited insight is possible, constrained by previous knowledge structures that only suggest what the event is
not. Thus, in nonroutine events, action changes the nature of the problem. This process
of problem solution in the collective-level paradox ultimately shapes knowledge emergence in this HRO:
Proposition 2a: In HROs, the interaction of individuals with diverse experiences creates a paradox needed for knowledge emergence while decreasing the possibility of error.
Proposition 2b: In HROs, knowledgeable action triggers the knowledge emergence process
while decreasing the possibility of error.

Individuals in Marion have extensive knowledge about most everything they do. However, even a brief moment of inattentiveness and belief that their knowledge is complete
can result in catastrophic consequences. Individuals in HROs must be “synoptic while
knowing that they can never fully achieve [full knowledge]” (La Porte & Consolini, 1991:
29). In this context, they must proactively analyze, search, and question their knowledge
before, during, and after the event has taken place. After the emergence of new knowledge, the formalization stage ensues in which the new knowledge becomes formalized
and integrated with the organizational knowledge system.

Phase 2 of the Knowledge Creation Process: Formalization of New Knowledge
The integration of new knowledge into the organization’s existing knowledge system is
an important step in the knowledge creation process (Coff et al., 2006; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). To leverage emergent knowledge, an organization must be able to scale and
formalize it (Coff et al., 2006). As illustrated in Figure 1, in Marion, the knowledge formalization phase of the knowledge creation process follows two paths. New knowledge
created during routine events is integrated in the informal knowledge structure of each
power plant. We term this knowledge structure informal because it is not formally codified. It exists in a collective understanding of “how things should be done” and entails
only minor adjustments to formal procedures. The informal knowledge structure enables
individuals to “bend the rules” when needed and adjust formal procedures to the situation
(i.e., contribute to and enable flexible experience). Alternatively, new knowledge created
during nonroutine events is immediately formalized and becomes a “binding rule for all.”
The informal knowledge structure (Dimension 6 of the knowledge creation process) Despite efforts to standardize practices, each plant approaches its activities and operations
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somewhat differently. Those variations stem from the unique history of routine events in
each plant. Each routine event encompasses natural variations requiring adjustments in
the patterns of actions (Pentland et al., 2012; Turner & Rindova, 2012). Consequently, as
individuals apply their knowledge in routine events, they also adjust it to the specific circumstances (March, 1991; Schulz, 2001). This adjustment increases flexibility of experience and builds the informal knowledge structure: a collection of well-understood, yet
not formally documented, activities for operation. To this end, the informal knowledge
structure in the plants and across the system exists within the interplay of past knowledge, present circumstances, and future expectations. An engineer described it as “experience that is transferred through generations and not possible to learn from the book.”
Over time, individuals might launch initiatives to formalize useful informal practices,
thus expanding the formal knowledge base. Launch of these initiatives by individuals
is part of organizational practice. It is the institutionalized manner in which flexibility,
changeability, and continuous development of the formal knowledge structure takes place.
Procedures, although necessary in this context, must be continuously reevaluated to remain relevant to new contingencies. In Marion, individuals continuously work to bring
forward new knowledge and insight and distribute it throughout the organization. Informal knowledge structures are thus an important platform from which individuals challenge the formal knowledge structure:
The initiative can come from any one engineer to regulate something . . . if that is
something that is perceived as important but it is not a part of the procedure currently . . . the engineer would recommend to us to formalize this particular practice.

The formal knowledge structure (Dimension 7 of the knowledge creation process). Procedures that compose the formal knowledge structure are codified activities that guide reliable operation in Marion. Whereas some informants described the procedures as “limiting,” all individuals recognized their necessity. In a casual conversation, one engineer
even described how he often resisted initiatives for standardization and development of
the systemwide formal knowledge structure. He believed that procedures diminish the
flexibility necessary for reliable performance. However, he stated that he now understands
the importance of the procedures to the everyday operation of his power plant. These procedures facilitate both the awareness of an event, as well as the initial action aimed at solution selection or generation.
In Marion, new knowledge is formalized in one of two ways. In routine events, individuals launch an initiative to formalize practices from the informal knowledge structure
and integrate them into the formal one. In contrast, new knowledge stemming from nonroutine events is immediately considered and formalized. Previous research suggests that
organizations might not always capitalize on knowledge created during past problems because of hindsight bias, or the tendency to overestimate the amount of information needed
to resolve the problem (Dillon & Tinsley, 2008). In Marion, this bias is minimized because
once the nonroutine event is neutralized, those involved immediately engage in a series
of meetings to dissect the issue and record everything that transpired during the event.
For example, after the nonroutine event described above occurred, the plant manager immediately convened a series of meetings with other plant managers and executives. During these meetings, they discussed what happened during the event, whether the action
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taken was appropriate, and how to define the issue. An informant from the LIM system
described the process to us as “local meetings”:
We hold the local meetings with all four power plants at the [LIM] headquarters. We
all have to be present: power plant manager, lead engineer, heads of technical service,
as well as technicians . . . we introduce the issue, and the lead engineer clarifies issues from the report. We discuss all the things that happened during the day, what was
done, etc. Depending on the issue, we then forward our suggestion to the BB board.

“Local meetings” are a defining characteristic of HROs. For example, La Porte and Consolini (1991) reported that employees conduct reporting sessions (what they term “hot
washups”) immediately after error identification as well as a series of debriefings during which employees discuss lessons learned. Similarly, Carroll et al. (2002) discussed
“problem investigations” as a critical aspect of corrective action programs. Our findings
indicate that local meetings are indeed important for the formalization of emergent understanding (i.e., lessons learned) and codification of new knowledge within the formal
knowledge structure. Where our findings depart from previous literature is that, in Marion, local meetings are not necessarily error-driven. The most relevant knowledge stems
from the nonroutine events that were appropriately handled and were error-free. During
these meetings, the nonroutine event is further scrutinized, formalized, and integrated
into the formal knowledge structure.
Collective-level paradox: Paradox of practice in the knowledge creation process. Coexistence of the formal and informal structures gives rise to the paradox of practice in the
knowledge formalization phase (Figure 2). Individuals incorporate both informal and
formal procedures in their practice to have more complete, although often paradoxical,
knowledge. The knowledge is paradoxical because the procedures are incomplete, only
partially connected, and occasionally opposing. Formal and informal procedures are by
definition incomplete because complete knowledge in HROs can never be fully attained
(La Porte & Consolini, 1991; Leveson et al., 2009). Furthermore, because informal procedures are more malleable, over time the gap between them and the formal procedures
widens. As a consequence, individuals must be mindful of these differences and navigate them with care. Finally, formal and informal knowledge can also be opposing. Partially due to the widening gap and partially due to the rigidity of the formal bureaucracy,
informal practices take a different form, thus allowing individuals to “play the system.”
For example, when asked to describe his activities, a plant manager read his job description, smiled, then asked, “Now, do you want to hear what I really do?” Employees continuously interweave both formal and informal knowledge structures into their activities
to preserve the emergent nature of knowledge necessary for reliable operation of their
plants. Given this, we propose,
Proposition 3a: HROs are characterized by the interwoven formal and informal knowledge structures that at least partially oppose one another.
Proposition 3b: In HROs, interrelating formal and informal procedures facilitates errorfree discovery in the knowledge creation process, thus increasing the reliability of
HROs.
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Organizational-level paradox: Paradox of organizing in the knowledge creation process.
HROs are paradoxical because they embody characteristics that are relatively discrete
in more mainstream organizations: certainty versus uncertainty, application of current
knowledge versus new discovery, hierarchical versus decentralized processes, and so on
(La Porte & Consolini, 1991; McIver et al., 2013). HROs have interdependent, tightly coupled structures necessary for reliable application of current knowledge, but are also flexible and able to absorb new insights stemming from nonroutine events. Indeed, individuals
in Marion continually oscillate between what they know and what they must discover. To
this end, our findings indicate that what makes the knowledge creation process in HROs
like Marion unique is that the paradox of organizing shapes the entire process. The paradox of organizing arises from tensions embedded in (a) the pervasive interdependencies
of the system and (b) the unpredictable yet hierarchical structure (Figure 2).
Interdependencies of the system contribute to the dangerous nature of HROs (Perrow,
1984). Specifically, because different segments in the system (machines, other equipment,
people, and plants) are closely connected and often dependent on each other for proper
performance, problems are more likely to escalate. Accidents occur most often not from
one malfunctioning part or human error but from the interaction of diverse components
that are closely linked (Leveson et al., 2009). However, what remains unclear is the nature of the interdependence in HROs and how that interdependence escalates danger on
one hand and shapes knowledge as a reliability-inducing process on the other (Leveson
et al., 2009).
Our findings indicate that interdependence is multilevel because it permeates individuals, collectives, and the structure of the organization and paradoxical because it
operates in opposing directions depending on the level it permeates. For individuals
and collectives, interdependence is embedded in the collective recombination of experiences occurring not just during routine and nonroutine events, but also in everyday
practices. Physical separation of offices is practically nonexistent (managers’ offices are
on the plant floor) and individuals tend to spend more time on the floor of the plant or
in communal areas than in their respective offices. For example, one of the engineers
made a remark during our conversation: “Earlier today I went to the plant [within the
LIM system] that just went through unplanned repairs because one of the aggregates
was acting up. I got to see how it worked out.” In other words, interdependence at the
individual and collective levels facilitates knowledge creation and transfer, increasing
the reliability of Marion.
In contrast, interdependence at the structural level increases the complexity of the
plants (Perrow, 1999) and contributes to the potential escalation of nonroutine events,
decreasing the reliability of Marion. At the structural level, interdependence is reflected
in the manner the plants are constructed (physical interdependence) as well as their mutual dependence on natural resources (natural interdependence). Physical interdependence exists in close, daily interaction of machines and employees. Machines are heavy,
are large, and have multiple interacting parts necessary for adjustment to the volatility
of the demand for energy. For example, the pump-storage plant in the BB system has several interacting parts that take on different roles depending on the demand for electricity. Natural interdependence extends beyond the organization and is embedded within
the landscape in which the plants are located. A plant manager explained that understanding natural interdependence is pertinent to the reliable performance of the system:
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All four plants [in the LIM system] are each a story in itself but are all hydrologically
related. If one experiences irregularities, the other may not have enough water in the
lake. . . . So in the system, [name of the] plant is the most important in terms of power
production, but they all need to function properly in order to maintain the voltage in
the network.

Building on these findings, we propose,
Proposition 4a: Interdependence between individuals and collectives facilitates the knowledge creation process, increasing the reliability of HROs.
Proposition 4b: Interdependence in the structure increases the complexity of the organization and possibility for large-scale errors, decreasing the reliability of HROs.

Tensions also surface from the organizational hierarchy. In its emphasis on high reliability, Marion is organized as a bureaucracy focused on the application of current procedures and top-down control. Individuals in Marion see standardized and strictly prescribed practices as key to reliable performance. Deviation from standard procedure is
considered extremely dangerous and strongly discouraged. In this context, focus is placed
on structured and rigid routines and repetition of current procedures rather than exploration for novelty (McIver et al., 2013). The standardization of practices and stringent controls ensure that everyone knows “what to do” because failures may “cost human lives.”
One of our participants explained,
The most important thing is to know what to do and what not to do, because this is
very powerful equipment and any error would cause great damage and possibly stoppage of the whole plant, and if they do not take this into account, people may also lose
lives and so we need to take care of people who work here daily.

However, in addition to being dangerous and highly controlled, HROs are also continually evolving and relatively unpredictable. HROs are reliable precisely because they capitalize on the benefits of bureaucracy (i.e., stringent control systems) while avoiding the
inertia of continuous restructuring that often accompanies bureaucracies (Bigley & Roberts, 2001). Individuals in Marion often experience multiple issues that interact in a complex manner— complex because the origin of the issue may not be fully comprehendible
a priori and because issues surface simultaneously (or almost simultaneously). As one of
our participants explained, the plant is “a living thing”:
The power plant is a process, a living thing, always something happening, you should
strive to be technically correct and safe and to address each and every element, as well
as equipment maintenance, hazardous substances are always an issue. And then there is
high-speed, mass, power, it is quite complex.

Our findings illustrate the paradox of organizing in HROs that operate in the tension
of a hierarchical, yet adaptive, structure. The paradox of organizing exists because HROs
necessarily operate with a stringent rule-based hierarchy despite their continuously changing, unpredictable context (McIver et al., 2013). Individuals in HROs must navigate this
paradox of control versus adaptation as they create new knowledge. Building on these
findings, we propose,
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Proposition 4c: Tensions arising from the rule-based hierarchy and the continuously changing, unpredictable nature of HROs give rise to the paradox of organizing.
Proposition 4d: The paradox of organizing in HROs permeates the organization and shapes
the entire knowledge creation process.

Discussion
Contemporary organizations are fundamentally complex and dynamically permeated
by numerous nested paradoxes (Coff et al., 2006; Lado et al., 2006; Smith & Lewis, 2011).
To understand contemporary organizations is to understand how paradoxical tensions
may be nested, how they scale, and how paradoxes at one level (e.g., individual) shape
those at another (e.g., collective) (Smith & Lewis, 2011). Problematizing organizational
paradoxes allows us to build theories that more fully mirror the complexity faced by contemporary organizations (Eisenhardt, 2000). In this study, we focus on knowledge creation as a fundamental paradox in HROs. Knowledge is created in paradox because, on
one hand, it enables one to handle events in the most appropriate manner while ensuring reliability and stability needed for optimal functioning of any organization. On the
other hand, however, if not continuously challenged, overreliance on current knowledge
may prevent the exploration needed to remain responsive to changes in the internal and
external environments.
In this study, we discover a nuanced approach to knowledge creation that incorporates two dynamic paths within three levels of paradox. Whereas previous research has
tended to underplay the paradoxical nature of knowledge, our findings indicate that paradox is critical to understanding how individuals transcend the boundaries of current understanding and generate novelty. Perhaps our most relevant contribution is the creation
of a framework of knowledge creation in organizations that explicates the paradoxes embedded within. We organize our discussion around (a) insights with regard to the nature
of HROs and how those insights may enrich our understanding of non-HROs and (b) insights with regard to the paradoxes in the knowledge creation process and how those insights might extend to non-HROs.

The Nature of High-Reliability Organizations
HROs exhibit a unique organizational context (Roberts, 1990) that may provide theoretical insights applicable to a wide range of complex organizations. Yet surprisingly little
empirical research has been devoted to understanding their uniqueness. For example, although their tight coupling and interdependence are identified as key facilitators of hazard (Leveson et al., 2009), there is insufficient understanding of why. Similarly, there is
only fractured understanding of what makes HROs reliable. In this study, we empirically
illustrate the nature of tight coupling and interdependence in an HRO as well as identify continuous knowledge creation, rather than redundancy, as a key platform for reliable performance.
Our findings illustrate two facets of interdependence—collective interdependence and
structural interdependence—that operate in opposition. Collective interdependence enables individuals in HROs to engage in diverse knowledge practices and prevent major
failures. In contrast, structural interdependence increases the complexity of the plants
(Perrow, 1984) and contributes to the escalation of hazardous events. By explicating the na-
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ture of the structural interdependence and providing insight into its two distinct forms—
physical and natural—we extend current understanding of HROs (Leveson et al., 2009).
Our findings also suggest that continuous knowledge creation facilitates reliable performance. HROs are strict bureaucracies because this structure allows them to exploit
current resources and apply predetermined procedures most appropriately (March, 1991;
Roberts, 1990). At the same time, our findings indicate that HROs often experience nonroutine events that cannot be resolved using existing knowledge. When this occurs, individuals must generate novel solutions through careful interweaving of current knowledge with tentative exploration. The process of new knowledge creation not only allows
individuals to neutralize potential failures before they occur but also permits the collective to build a repertoire of knowledgeable practices that allows them to notice and recognize potential cues to failure. Thus, to understand what makes organizations reliable
is to understand how they create new knowledge amid potential danger.
Extension to non-HROs. Non-HROs tend to value reliability and embody paradoxical
characteristics as well, although to a lesser degree. To this end, insights from HROs may
be useful for theorizing how multiple paradoxes are managed as well as how high levels of reliability are achieved without sacrificing search and exploration. This is important because, as Lado et al. (2006: 115) recognize, “companies may succeed or fail based
on differences in their capabilities to manage paradox.” We offer two theoretical insights
that may extend understanding of non-HROs: (a) the paradox of stability and change and
(b) the dynamism of reliability.
We uncover how non-HROs work through the paradox of organizing exemplified in
the tension between the need for stability and the need for change (Smith & Lewis, 2011).
Similar to HROs, non-HROs struggle with incorporating variance-inducing practices such
as innovation and flexibility with variance-reducing practices such as reliability and routines (Farjoun, 2010; Feldman & Pentland, 2003). Simple separation, however, provides
only an imperfect solution—bureaucracies can be flexible (Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Milosevic & Bass, 2014) and structures may be instrumental for creativity and innovation
(Harrison & Rouse, 2014; Pentland et al., 2012). Our findings contribute to this stream of
research by empirically illustrating how bureaucracies achieve flexibility and how constraints facilitate new knowledge creation. We show how individuals interweave standard operating procedures with the discovery process to generate new knowledge and integrate it with the organizational knowledge system. In doing so, we illustrate the nested
nature of the stability/change paradox that permeates most contemporary organizations
(Smith & Lewis, 2011).
Our findings also provide insight into the concept of reliability. In HROs, reliability signifies failure-free performance. For non-HROs, reliability is evident in consistent service,
stability of core activities, or even the ability to bounce back from environmental shocks
(Dillon & Tinsley, 2008; Farjoun, 2010; Turner & Rindova, 2012). However, in contrast to
research that portrays reliability as a stability-oriented, variance decreasing mechanism,
our findings indicate that maintaining reliability is a daunting task requiring continuous
awareness and proactive work. Individuals engage in numerous microadaptations to accommodate emergent unplanned events and deliver consistency (Turner & Rindova, 2012).
We extend this insight by illustrating how individuals manage paradoxes inherent in these
microadaptations through initial inquiry and coordination. Indeed, initial inquiry and coordination may be key facets of knowledge creation even in failure-tolerant organizations
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Paradoxes in the knowledge creation process. A critical contribution lies within the discovery of three levels of paradox that individuals experience and navigate to create new
knowledge. To this end, our findings align with previous research by showing that the
continuous interaction between less and more experienced individuals is important and
that continual awareness enables employees to recognize dangerous signals and appropriately classify them as novel or not (Weick & Roberts, 1993). Our findings also align
with the notion that new knowledge integration with the current system is integral to the
knowledge creation process (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Matusik & Heeley, 2005; Nonaka
& Von Krogh, 2009).
We extend theory by providing a framework of knowledge creation that explicates three
levels of paradox—paradox of knowing, paradox of practice, and paradox of organizing.
Paradox of knowing occurs when individuals experience a deviation in their work that requires them to simultaneously utilize their current knowledge, challenge what they know,
and engage in initial inquiry to generate preliminary insights into the deviation. Paradox of
practice exists in the space between old and new knowledge in both the knowledge emergence phase (between individuals) and the knowledge formalization phase (between the
formal and informal knowledge structures). The interplay of formal and informal structures in the paradox of practice gives rise to the overall malleability of the organizational
knowledge system, which is necessary for reliable performance.
Finally, the paradox of organizing embodies the larger organizational context in which
knowledge creation is situated. Centralization and procedural control at the organizational
level can coexist with individual discovery and the ability to change the system at the individual level. They are interrelated, creating the paradox of organizing that individuals
experience and navigate to create new knowledge and ensure continuous reliability. In
HROs, individuals might ignore prescribed procedures when those procedures are categorized as unsafe or irrelevant to the given circumstances (Leveson, 1995). However, ignoring prescribed rules can lead to a major catastrophe, and the distinction between the
two is clear only in hindsight (Leveson et al., 2009). By exploring how individuals interweave contextual contingencies into their knowledge practice, we provide stronger insight into this distinction. Our contribution lies in illustrating the conditions in which ignoring procedures enables new knowledge creation and continuous reliability of HROs.
Extension to non-HROs. Experimentation and errors are often portrayed as instrumental in the knowledge creation process (McIver et al., 2013; Schulz, 2001; Zhao, 2011). In
this perspective, new knowledge is created as errors are detected, analyzed, and resolved.
However, this perspective implicitly assumes that because non-HROs are more failure-tolerant, the benefits of gaining insight from errors outweigh the costs of making them. As
a consequence, non-HROs are required to engage in cost/benefit analysis and choose between their desire for consistency of performance and new knowledge creation. By embracing the paradox perspective, however, organizations may be able to move away from
either–or thinking and foster the “ability to recognize and accept the interrelated relationship of underlying tensions” (Smith & Lewis, 2011: 391) for a more holistic, yet paradoxical approach to knowledge creation.
Doing so is difficult, however, because in an effort to comprehend an increasingly ambiguous and ever-changing reality, individuals tend to opt for simplicity, creating polarized either–or distinctions (Lewis, 2000; Smith & Lewis, 2011). As a consequence, when
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faced with paradox, they often remove, rather than work through, it. They choose activities that worked in the past, focus on a single choice, and remove opportunities for further exploration. This in turn reinforces the rigidity of action and stifles discovery (Lado
et al., 2006; Poole & Van de Ven, 1989). Our findings illustrate that individuals do not
simply follow rules and procedures on one hand, and pursue solution generation on the
other. Nor do they oscillate between standardized and improvised actions. Rather, through
coordination, individuals interweave constraints with their own experiences and knowledgeably act to facilitate discovery. Therefore, we provide a more fine-grained depiction
of how individuals work through paradoxes to create new knowledge.

Limitations
Though the topic of this study is timely and increasingly relevant, there are several
limitations that should be addressed. First, there are limitations related to the particularities of our research methodology. Though qualitative methods offer robustness in
detailed, rich descriptions of organizational life, as observers, immersion in these rich
details can never be fully appreciated, explicated, or communicated. With regard to this
particular study, a struggle exists between providing rich description of our findings and
presenting and connecting them with extant research (Wolcott, 2008). Thus, a limitation of this study, similar to other qualitative research, is achieving “seamless quality”
while presenting “an adequate level of detail” (Wolcott, 2008: 107). Rather than imposing analytical elements on our study, we embrace the interplay of individuals and context, which forms the knowledge creation process in Marion. We attempt to describe
this interplay to highlight the importance of studying both when seeking to understand
knowledge creation in HROs.
Second, in an effort to focus our study, we had to omit several interesting avenues suggested by our data. For example, our findings indicate that “rite of passage” is important to
knowledge creation because it enhanced reliability in Marion. Future research could investigate differences in organizational design and strategic human resource practices that facilitate the rite of passage, enabling continuous knowledge-driven interaction among less
and more experienced individuals. In addition, our findings indicated that certain individuals took on informal leadership roles in the knowledge creation process and distributed knowledgeable practices across the plants. Our data also indicated that conditions
under which individuals tend to ignore prescribed procedures is important (Leveson et
al., 2009). To keep focus on the knowledge creation process as a conduit to reliable performance, we could not devote significant attention in our narrative to these elements. However, we do believe these to be fruitful directions for future research. In sum, our findings
provide important implications for theory but also highlight several avenues for research
to pursue to extend our understanding of knowledge creation in context.

Conclusion
HROs embody a paradox—their dangerous and dynamic context can generate exceptions that require new knowledge without opportunity for learning through failures. And
so we ask, how is new knowledge created in the context where opportunities for exploration and learning through errors are absent? In pursuing this question, we challenge linear processes of sequential, identifiable stages of knowledge creation and call for a more
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dynamic understanding. Our findings offer that knowledge exists in a dynamic interplay
of experience, actions, and interactions that occur organically as individuals struggle to
understand problems under intense pressures. In doing so, individuals experience and
navigate three levels of paradox occurring along one of two paths in which knowledge is
created. We offer an overarching framework of knowledge creation in context in which
complete knowledge can never be attained; yet the pursuit of complete knowledge drives
continuous action to achieve reliable, mistake-free operation.
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